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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant in its brief has made a statement of the
facts in this case. We adopt that statement of facts to
avoid unnecessary repetition. We call attention, however, to the further fact that under the second paragraph

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
of the trust instrument in question (.1\b. 7, Tr. 5), the
trustor not only reserved to herself the entire net incon1e
from the property for the term of her natural life, but
also vested in the trustee the right to invade the principal
and pay to the trustor in addition to the income "such
amounts * * * from the corpus, as, in the sole judgment
of the trustee rnay be reasonably required, especially in
an emergency, for'' the support, maintenance and general
welfare of the trustor.

QUESTION
The sole question presented by this appeal is one
of law, namely, whether the property transferred by Angelena A. Walker by means of the trust indenture is
subject to inheritance tax under Chapter 12, Title 80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.
It is the position of respondent that this transfer is
a taxable transfer within the provisions of Section 8012-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended, and
that this transfer comes directly within the statutory
provision including within th€ value of the gross estate of
a decent transfers ''made * * * or intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after" the death of the
transferor.
Section 80-12-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
reads as follows :
''The value of the gross estate of a decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property, real or personal,
'vithin the jurisdiction of this state, and any inter-
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3
est therein, \Yhether tangible or intangible, which
shall pass to any person, in trust or otherwise,
hy testn1nentn r:y disposition or by la-\v or inheritance or sncePssion of this or any other state or
country, or by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift
rnade in conte1nplation of the death of the grantor,
vendor or donor, or intended to take effect in possession or e11joy·nzent at or after his death." (Italics ours.)

It is respondent's position that the transfer made by
. .-\ngelena A. Walker by means of the trust indenture in
question comes within the exact language of the italicized
portion of the statute both as to letter and intent.

ARGUMENT
..._.\._ppellant has throughout this proceeding maintained that the transfer in question is not subject to tax,
and relies for that position entirely upon the following
cases:
llfay v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 74 L. ed. 826;
Comrnissioner v. Northern Trust Company, 41
Fed. (2d) 732, 283 U. S. 782;
Conunissioner v. McCormick, 43 Fed. (2d) 277,
283 U. S. 784;
Commissioner v. Morsman, 44 Fed. (2d) 902,
283 U. S. 783.

The rule laid down in these cases left no question
with regard to what will hereinafter be denoted the Federal rule as to the taxability of this type of transfer. For
the purpose of this case, "\Ve may disregard the 1932
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amendment to the Federal estate tax. See 2G U. S. C. A.,
Section 811.
It is the position of respondent that the rule announced in these Federal cases is erroneous and against
the overwhelming weight of authority. As will be demonstrated, every state court of last resort, without exception, which has had this same problem presented to
it, has held such a transfer as the one here involved to be
a transfer made or intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after the transferor's death. \Ve
submit that the rule announced by all of the state courts
of last . resort is the better reasoned rule and the one
which should be followed by this Court. vV e also submit
the appellant is incorrect when it states at Page 10 of
its brief that the question involved here is a matter of
"first impression" in this Court. It is our position, as
will be den1onstra ted, that this Court has already spoken
on this problem and has announced the rule that such a
transfer as this is taxable.
In developing our argu1nent, we will treat, first, the
Federal rule and, second, the rule announced by the state
courts which have considered this problem.

The Federal Rule
The beginning of the rule in the Federal courts that
such a transfer as the one here involved was not subject
to tax as a transfer intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death is found in the case of
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U. S. :1:19, 7~~
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L. ed. -±10. That ease inYolved the question of the taxability of SPYen trusts \Yhieh \Yere created inter vivos.
In t\YO of the trust~ the settlor reserved to himself the
ineon1e for life but also reserYed the right to revoke the
trusts at any ti1ne. Being revocable, these two trusts
"~ere held taxable in line \Yith the generally recognized
rule that the reserYation of the power of revocation
destroys the present effect of the transfer and makes the
transfer subject to death duty tax. The other five trusts,
ho,vever, \Yere irrevocable and the settlor reserved no interest "~hatever in the trust property and reserved no
right to the income, control, management or any other
po,ver in connection with the trust property. The Supreme Court of the United States, in passing upon these
five trusts, held that they were not subject to tax as part
of the estate of the settlor. It was with reference to these
latter five trusts that the Supreme Court stated the following at Pages 347-8 of 278 U. S.:
"In its plan and scope the tax is one imposed
on transfers at death or made in contemplation of
death and is measured by the value at death of the
interest \\Thich is transferred. * * * It is not a gift
tax, and the tax on gifts once imposed by the
Revenue Act of 1924, c. 234, 43 Stat. 313, has
been repealed, 44 Stat. 126. One may freely give
his property to another by absolute gift without
subjecting himself or his estate to a tax, but we
are asked to SB-Y that this statute means that he
1nav not make a gift inter vivos, equally absolute
and complete, vvithout subjecting it to a· tax if the
gift takes the forin of a life estate in one with
remainder over to another at or after the donor's
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death. It would require plain and con1pelling language to justify so incongruous a result and we
think it is wanting in the present statute."
One might well ask what bearing this decision could
possibly have on the question of the taxability of an
irrevocable trust in which the settlor reserved to himself
the income for life. Nevertheless, it was entirely upon
the authority of the Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company
case, supra, that the Supreme Court decided the case of
May v. Heiner, supra. In the May v. Heiner case the
facts were that during her lifetime Mrs. Pauline May
transferred to her husband, Barney May, and others, as
trustees, certain securities to hold in trust and to collect
the income therefrom and manage as trustees. The
trust instrument provided that the net income from the
trust property was to be paid to Barney May during his
lifetime, and after his death to Pauline l\fay during her
lifetime; after her death the corpus of the trust was to be
divided and distributed equally among the four children
of Pauline May. We thus see that the net incon1e from
the trust property was not reserved by the trustor to
herself but was transferred immediately for life to another person, in that case, her husband. At best, Mrs.
May, the settlor, had reserved to herself only a possibility of reverter in the income contingent upon her surviving her husband.
In spite of the difference between the facts in the
May v. Heiner case when compared with the Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Company case, the Supreme Court of thP
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Unitt:.•d Sta h:)s, in nn opinion \Yhich \\Te submit contained
practically no rPn~oning or theor~· for the decision but
relies solel~T upon the Reinecke v. Northern Trust Cornpan y case, held that the trust \Yas not taxable in the
estate of Pauline .J~ n~,. and quoted the above paragraph
which \Ye have quoted fro1n the case of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company as the basis for the decision. We
submit that not only \Yas the Reinecke 1'. Northern Trust
Co111pany case not in point, but further, that even if considered in point, it did not hold that such a trust as was
present in the May v. Heiner case would not be taxable.
Ho\\'"eYer, \Ye might not be so inclined to quarrel \vith
the J.llay ,r. Heiner decision were it not for its subsequent
application to another entirely different set of facts as
evidenced by the per curiam decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in the cases of Cornmissioner v.
Northern Trust Company, supra; Commissioner v. M cCor·mick, supra; and Commissioner v. M orsman, supra.
In the Commissioner v. Northern Trust Company and
Commissioner v. Morsman: cases, the facts were substantially those presented in the case at bar, namely, the
settlor had created an irrevocable trust with a reservation to himself for the term of his life of the net incon1e
from the trust property, and at his death the corpus of
the trust to be distributed to other individuals. Note that
the reservation of net income in these latter cases was
directly reserved, without any intervening beneficiary, by
the settlor to himself. Contrast those facts with the facts
in ]Jf ay v. Heiner, where the settlor reserved the income
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to another person for life and then, and onl~v then, to
the settlor should she survive the intervening beneficiary.
Contrast these facts in the latter cases also with the facts
in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company. It will be seen
that the facts are totally dissimilar. Yet the United
States Supreme Court by per curiam decisions held that
the trusts involved in the latter cases were not subject
to tax in the estate of a deceased settlor, citing only the
case of May v. Heiner as authority.
We, therefore, submit that at least two errors were
made by the United States Supreme Court in handling
this problem: first, when the United States Supreme
Court decided May v. Heiner solely upon authority of
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company; and second, when
it decided Commissioner v. Northern Trust Contpany,
Commissioner v. McCormick and Commissioner /v. JJlorsman upon sole authority of JJfay v. Heiner. We there see
the final culmination of the application of a rule announced in one case to a problem presented in another
case where apparently there \vas not a careful distinction
made between facts of the two cases.
It is further our position that the case of May 1·.
Heiner, and consequently the cases decided upon authority of May v. Ileiner, have been overruled by the recent
case of Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 84 L. ed.
Adv. Op. 382.
Before discussing the case of H elvering v. Hallock, it
may be helpful to refer to some legislative history in
connection with the Federal rule announced in May v.
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H eint:r. ..:\ t the tilne 1.l/ ay r. Heiner was decided, Section ~10~ (e) of the Rt>venue Act of 1926 (the saine provisions are al8o found in Section 402 (c) of the Revenue
Act of 1918) provided in substantial effect the same as
our statute. ....\s noted above, Ill ay v. Heiner did not involYe exactly the saine factual situation as is here involYed. Accordingly, the government brought to the Supreme Court the r..rorthern Trust Company and Morsnzan eases, supra. As noted above, these cases were decided by per curiam opinions. These opinions were rendered :Jiarch 2, 1931. On the following day, l\f arch 3,
1931, the Congress of the United States passed a joint
resolution ainending Section 302 (c) by specifically including 'vithin a transfer to take effect at death any
transfer ''by trust or otherwise, under which he (the
grantor) has retained for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any
period which does not in fact end before his death, ( 1)
the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, * * *. ''

The day on 'vhich this joint resolution passed was the
last day of that session of Congress. Furthermore, the
Treasury Department submitted this joint resolution to
Congress on the afternoon of the same day that the Supreme Court announced its decisions in the three per
curiam cases above referred to, thus reaffirming May v.
Heiner and applying it to cases with facts identical with
the present. From this legislative history, we submit only
one conclusion can be deduced, namely, Congress felt that
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the United States Supreme Court had not interpreted
their previous statutory language with the intent with
which the language was enacted.
With this additional background, let us consider the
Helverilng v. Hallock case. In that case the facts were
as follows: The decedent had created a trust in 1919
giving the income to his wife for life and further providing that upon the death of his wife the trust should terminate. If the decedent survived his wife, then the
trustees were to pay over to the decedent the entire
corpus of the trust, together with accumulated incon1e,
but if the decedent were not living at the date of death of
!1is wife, then the trust property was to go to the children
of the decedent therein named. The decedent died in
1932 and his "\vife survived hin1. On this set of facts the
United States Supre1ne Court held that the transfeT \Yas
one coming within the original provisions of Section 302
(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, which was the same as
was considered in JJf ay v. II einer. In making this decision, the United States Supreme Court specifically overruled the ca-se of Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust
Company, 296 U. S. 39, 80 L. ed. 29, and Becker v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co1npany, 296 U. S. 48, 80 L. ed. 35.
In 1-Ielvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Cornpany the
decedent had placed property in trust, the income of
which was to be paid to his daughter during her lifetime, and if at her death the settlor was still living, then
the trustee was directed to pay the entire estate over to
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the settlor. If the ~ettlor \Y0l'P not living at the date of
death of the benefiei~1r~y' then certain other disposition of
the property \\-as 1nadP.
In Becker r. ~.._(.,)t. Louis [;nion Trust Company, the
decedent had declared himself trustee of certain property
'vith the income to be aerumulated, or, at his discretion,
to be paid over to his daughter rluring her lifetime. The
instrlm1ent also provided that if the beneficiary died before the settlor, then the trust 'vas to terminate and
revert to the settlor, but that if the settlor died first,
then the trust also was to terminate but the property to
go to the beneficiary.
In both of those cases the Supreme Court had previously held that the transfers did not come within the
terms of Section 302 (c) and were not includable within
the gross estate of the decedent. The decision 'vas made
in those cases in spite of the previous holding of the
Supreme Court in the case of Klein v. United States,
283 U. S. 231, 73 L. ed. 996, in which case the decedent
had conveyed real estate to his wife for her lifetime with
a provision that if she should die prior to the grantor,
then she should take no greater than the life estate and
the property should revest in the grantor; but that if
the grantee survived the grantor, then the grantee should
have a fee simple title. In this Klein case, the Supreme
Court held the transfer to come within the provisions
of Section 302 (c) and to be taxable as a transfer to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the
death of the grantor.
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It is to be remen1bered that throughout all of these
latter cases which we are now discussing, and throughout
the case of Helvering v. llallock, the Supreme Court
was dealing with the same statute with which it dealt
in the May v. Heiner case, as that statute existed prior
to the amendment by the joint resolution referred to
supra.
In dealing with the Klein and St. Louis Union Trust
Company cases, the Supreme Court, in the Helvering v.
Hallock case, said that there was no difference in the
actualities of the situation in any of the cases and that a
mere difference in phrasing or a difference in the vehicle
selected to make the transfer should make no difference
in the taxability of the transfer, and, as noted above,
specifically overruled the St. Louis Union Trust Co1npany cases, holding all such inter vivos transfers taxable.
In this connection the Supre1ne Court stated at P.age
384 of 84 L. ed. Adv. Op. :
''All involve dispositions of property by "\vay
of trust in which the settlement provides for return or reversion of the corpus to the donor upon
a contingency ter1ninable at his death. Whether
the transfer made by the decedent in his lifetime
is 'intended to take effect in possession and enjoyn1ent at or after his death' by reason of that which
he retained, is the crux of the problem. * ·* Section 302 (c) deals with property not technically
passing at death but with interests theretofore
created. The taxable event is a transfer inter
vivos. But the measure of the tax is the value of
the transferred property at the tilne \Vhen death
brings it into enjoyment.''
>)(•
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'

...\study of the Ilelrerin,(} 'P. Hallock case, the St.
Louis D~n,ion Trust Con1pany cases and the Klein case
demonstrate~~ \\·e ~ub1nit, that the United States Supreme
Court has actually reconsidered the position it took in
lllay v. Heiner and ha~ in1pliedl)· overruled the effect of
JI ay v. Heiner. In this connection it is to be noted that
there never has been a reason for asking the United
States Supre1ne Court to specifically overrule May v.
Heiner, since by reason of the an1endn1ent by the joint
resolution above referred to, the lJJay v. Heiner situation
had been specifically covered. Therefore, the United
States Supreme Court has not been presented with a case
requiring it to directly overrule May v. Heiner, but the
effect of Ill ay v. Heiner certainly is gone when the
lTnited States Supreme Court in subsequent cases under
the san1e statute holds that the reservation of a mere
possibility of reverter contingent upon the grantor surviving the grantee is sufficient to make the transfer a
taxable one 'vi thin the meaning of the phrase ''intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death.'' If the reservation of a mere possibility of reverter is a postponement of possession or enjoyment of
property until the death of the grantor, then, a fortiori,
the reservation of the power of realizing total economic
benefit from the property until the death of the grantor
must be also a postponement of possession or enjoyment
until death.
That this Helvering v. Hallock case has overruled
"AI ay v. Heiner, and the cases decided solely upon authority of jf ay v. ·H e,iner, has been recognized by the Supreme

J

II
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Court itself-at least by the Justices of the Court who
dissented from the decision in H elvering v. Hallock.
Speaking of the decision in May v. Ileiner, the dissenting
opinion in Helvering v. I-Iallock makes the following
statement at 84 L. ed. Adv. Op. 393:
''That decision is indistinguishable in principle from the St. Louis Union Trust Company
cases and the instant cases; * * *."
By these very words, the dissenting opinion recognizes that the St. Louis Trust Company cases and the
Helvering v. Hallock case were the same in principle as,
and to be governed by, the application of the same legal
theory as governed May v. Heiner. Therefore, we say
that it is an inescapable conclusion that the Helvering v.
Hallock case has overruled llJay v. Heiner and that the
United States Supreme Court has by this decision recognized the error which crept into its decisions in May
v. Heiner and the three subsequent cases decided upon
the principle of May v. Heiner.
In fact, it is difficult to understand how any inter
vivos transfer could fall within the meaning of the words
"made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor'' if the transaction in the case at bar is not such a transfer. It
would appear obvious that the wording of the statute
was meant to cover a present or inter vivos transfer. It
was certainly not meant to cover a situation where there
was actually no transfer at all but merely an ostensible
transfer such as would be involved were the owner of
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propert~~

to 1uake a deed of the property to a certain indiYidual but not deliYer that deed and make arrangements
for the grantee to ~eeure the deed upon the death of the
grantor. In that ~ituation, 've submit, there would be no
transfer at alL The ",.or(ls of the statute state that the
gross estate of the decedent is to include every transfer
by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift made or intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death. If the holding back by the grantor of the· economic
benefits of the property is not a postponement of the
enjoyn1ent of the property until his death, then the words
in the statute become entirely meaningless.

' Te sub1nit that logic, reason and common sense all
demonstrate that the rule announced in Jl;Jay v. Heiner
did not give effect to the intent and meaning of the
legislative expression of Congress, and that the Supreme
Court has subsequently recognized that the May v.
He·iner rule did not effectuate legislative intent.

The State Court Rule
As indicated above, the Federal courts stand alone
in their unique position of holding a transfer such as the
one involved in the case at bar not to be a transfer made
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death. Every state court of last resort, to which
the problem has been presented in decisions rendered
both prior to and after the May v. Heiner case, has held
such a transfer to be a taxable transfer. VVe list a few
of the cases from various jurisdictions holding directly
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opposite to the rule announced in JJ1ay v. Heiner and
holding that a transfer of property with a reservation
to the transferor of the income from the property for
life, or the reservation of a life estate in the property, to
be a taxable transfer. The cases listed are by no means
exhaustive but do represent a fair cross section.
ARIZONA

In re Hubbs, 41 Ariz. 466, 19 Pac. (2d) 672 (1933)
CALIFORNIA

Kelly v. Woolsey, 177 Cal. 325, 170 Pac. 837 (1918)
In re Brix's Estate, 181 Cal. 667, 186 Pac. 135
(1919)
CONNECTICUT

Hacket v. Bankers Trust Co., 122 Conn. 107, 187
Atl. 653 (1936)
Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 114
Conn. 207, 158 Atl. 245 (1932); see also 287
U. S. 509.
ILLINOIS

People v.
(1936)
People v.
161 N.
People v.
(1927)

Moses, 363 Ill. 423, 2 N. E. (2d) 724
Northern Trust Company, 330 Ill. 238,
E. 525 (1928)
McCormick, 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861

IOWA

In the Matter of the Estate of Toy, 220 Iowa 82;),
263 N. W. 501 (1935)
Lamb's Estate v. Morrow, 140 Iowa 89, 117 N. W.
1118 (1908)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
KANSAS

llnssell v. Co.(]Slrell, 151 Kan. 14, 98 Pac. (2d) 179
(19-!0)
KENTUCKY

Barclay ·s T·rustee r. Conzmonwealth, 156 Ky. 455,
161 s. w. 310 (1913)
MASSACHUSETTS

Worcester County National Bank v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 275 Mass.
216, 175 N. E. 726 (1931)
State Street Tru.st Company v. Stevens, 209 Mass.
373, 95 N. E. 851 (1911)
MICHIGAN

In re Kutsche's Estate, 268 Mich. 659, 256 N. W.
586 (1934)
MINNESOTA

In re Estate of Rising, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N. W.
459 (1932)
In re Estate of Marshall, 179 Minn. 233, 228 N. W.
920 (1930)
MONTANA

In re Schuh's Estate, 66 Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516
(1923)

NEVADA
Cole v. Nickel, 43 Nev. 12, 177 Pac. 409 (1919);
Aff. on rehearing, 185 Pac. 565 (1919)
NEW HAMPSHIRE

Ki1nball v. Potter, ____ N. H. ____ , 196 Atl. 272 (1938)
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NEW JERSEY

Carter v. Bugbee, 91 N. J. L. 438, 103 Atl. 818
(1918)
IJ1acClurkan v. Bugbee, 105 N. J. L. 89, 143 Atl.
757 (1928)
City Bank Farmers Trust Company v. McCutcheon, 8. N. J. M. 547, 151 Atl. 78 (1930)
J(och v. McCutcheon, 111 N. J. L. 154, 167 Atl.
752 (1933)
NEW YORK

In re Green's Estate~ 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292
(1897)
In re Brandreth's Estate, 169 N. Y. 437, 62 N. E.
563 (1902)
In re Keertey's Estate, 194 N. Y. 281, 87 N. E.
42~; affirmed by U. S. Supreme Court, 222
U. S. 525
OHIO

Sherman v. Tax Comrnission, 125 0. S. 367, 181
N. E. 539 (1932)'
OREGON

In re Lo.wengart's Estate, 160 Ore. 118, 84 Pac.
(2d) 105 (1938)
PENNSYLVANIA

In re Husband's Estate, 316 Pa. 361, 175 Atl. 503
(1934)
Appeal of DuBois, 121 Pa. 368, 15 A tl. 641 ( 1888)
Reish v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. St. Rep. 521
(1884)

UTAH
In re Romney's Estate, 60 Ut. 173,.207 Pac. 139
(1922)
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\VASHINGTON

In re Ell is· Estate, 169 Wash. 581, 14 Pac. (2d)
~17 (1932)
WISCONSIN

In re Ogden's Estate, 209 Wis. 162, 244 N. W.
571 (1932)
Estate of Waite, 208 'Vis. 307, 242 N. W. 173
(1932)
-L-\t the outset, it may be stated \vithout qualification

that the rule announced in illay v. Heiner, and followed
in the subsequent cases heretofore referred to in the
United States Supreme Court, has never been considered,
and should not be considered, as in any way binding upon
the Supreme Court of a state in its consideration of this
problen1. Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Cornpany, 114
Conn. 207, 158 Atl. 245, 287 U. S. 509. This Guaranty
Trust Company case arose after the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of May v.
Heiner. The Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut
\Vas presented with the question of taxability under the
Connecticut Death Duty Tax Law of a trust with exactly
the same provisions as the trust here involved. The Connecticut court held that such transfers were transfers
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
the death of the grantor and should be included within
the gross estate of the deceased trustor. This Guaranty
Trust Company case is highly instructive in its discussion
of both the Reinecke v. Northern Trust Contpany decision, supra, and the JJf ay v. Heiner decision, supra. The
Connecticut Supreme Court decided that the Reinecke
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case is not in point; that the ]}fay 1:. 11 einer case is at
best only a decision involving judicial construction of a
statutory provision; that it 'vas in no way bound by the
decision of the United States Supreme Court; and concludes that the transfer by such a trust is taxable. The
case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which held that in its consideration of the treatment of
such a transfer by the State of Connecticut it, the United
States Supreme Court, was bound by the decision of the
Connecticut Supreme Court, and that since the taxability
of such a trust as a transfer intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death violated no
provision of the Federal Constitution, there was nothing
for the United States Supreme Court to pass upon, and
affirmed the Connecticut Court's decision. It is worthy of
note that throughout its decision in this Guaranty Trust
Company case the United States Supreme Court does not
even mention the May v. Heiner decision. It is also worthy of note that nowhere in its decision does the United
States Supreme Court attempt to reconcile t~e Connecticut decision with its own decision on identical statutory
provisions by any resort to a distinction between the Federal tax as an estate tax and the Connecticut tax as an
inheritance tax.
Appellant has made some point in its brief of the
fact that ~the Utah "inheritance tax" is in reality an
estate tax. We do not quarrel with that position. See
State Tax Commission v. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55 Pac.
(2d) 171. We also do not quarrel with appellant's propo-
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~ition that ~o1ne of the rleci~ions of the state courts which

haYe dealt \Yith thi~ prohle1n have distinguished ft! ay v.
Heiner upon the g-round that the particular state tax
"""as an inheritanre tax, ""'hereas the Federal tax involved
in the 111ay v. Heiner ease \Yas an estate tax. In this regard, " . e submit that the state courts which have made
this distinction have done so only in order to avoid directly disagreeing ""'ith the United States Supreme Court.
Other state courts have n1ade no such distinction but
have either ignored May v. Ileiner or said that the interpretation there announced is not to be follo"\ved. So
far as the question raised by the case at bar is concerned,
there is and can be no valid distinction made as between
the t,,.. o types of death duties. The question is-.Was the
transfer in question a transfer made or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death
of the grantor~ If, as appellant apparently concedes,
the state courts dealing with inheritance taxes were correct in holding that a transfer such as this was a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death, then we submit the same transfer is of
the same eharacter when considered from an estate tax
standpoint. The only recognized distinction between inheritance and estate taxes is that the "inheritance" tax
is placed upon the right of the distributee or beneficiary
to receive the property; in the ''estate'' tax the levy is
upon the right of the decedent to transmit or transfer
the property in a certain manner. Therefore, if under an
inheritance tax the ultimate beneficiary of this type of
trust would not receive the property in possession or en-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
joyment until at or after the death of the settlor, then
it is inconceivable that the transfer from the settlor could
have taken effect or vested in possession or enjoyment
until at or after his death. We submit that there is no
valid distinction upon this basis between the unanimous
holdings of the state courts and the holding of the United
States Supreme Court on identical facts and substantially
identical statutes. The two views are irreconcilable. The
question then becomes-,Vhich view are we to follow~
To discuss in detail even a cross section of the cases
decided by the state supren1e courts would make this
brief too voluminous. We, therefore, will treat only one
or two of the representative state decisions.
At this phase of our argu1nent we refer again to the
position announ~ed above, that in our opinion this problem is not one of first impression in this Court. It is our
position that the case of In re Romney's Estate, 60
Utah 173, 207 Pac. 139 (1922), settled this proble1n for
our jurisdiction. The facts in that case were as follows:
In 1903 George Romney, a man of considerable means,
formed a corporation known as George Romney and Sons
Company. He transferred to this corporation certain
real property and a lumber business and received in
exchange for this property substantially all of ;·the stock
of the corporation. Almost immediately thereafter,
George Romney transferred all but eight shares of the
stock of the corporation to his children. He died seventeen years later.
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In 190:-3 and nga1n in 1908, ~I r. Ron1ney executed
certain "'transfers'· b~r '" hich he ''sold and assigned''
to the rorporation soinP $500,000.00 in stocks of other
rorporations. In thes0 dorn1nents denoted "transfers,"
it \Yas recited that G-eorge Ron1ney had indorsed and delivered the certificates of stock to George Romney and
Sons Company. Ho\Yever, during the ensuing years of
his life, George Ro1nney received all of the dividends
from these stocks, and the stocks were never transferred
on the books of the various corporations. The estate
contended that there was a completed transfer of the
stocks to the corporation during the lifetime of George
Ron1ney and, therefore, that there was no interest in
these stock certificates which would be taxable at the
death of George Ron1ney. The Attorney General, on the
other hand, contended, and rested its case upon this contention, that the transfer to the corporation was a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after the death of the transferor. This Court held
those transfers to the corporation to be taxable as transfers to take effect in enjoyment at or after death and
laid down the following rules at Pages 141-142 of 207
Pac.:
''It \vould serve no good purpose to further
review the history of the control over this stock or
the certificates of stock representing the interests
in the various corporations by George Romney
during his lifetime. It is enough for the purpose
of the question presented by this appeal to state
that no other conclusion is logical or reasonably
inferrable from the history of the entire transac-
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tion than that the enjoyment and beneficial interest of the stock that finally found resting place in
the name of the respondent corporation did not
vest in such corporation during the life of the
donor.
"The law here applicable is concisely stated
in the third headnote to Reish, Adm'r. v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 521, which clearly reflects the
decision in that case, and which reads as follows :
'The owner of an estate cannot defeat
the plain provisions of the Collateral Inheritance Law (Act of April 7, 1826) by
any device which secures to him, for life,
the income, profits and enjoy1nent of his
estate. Said law can only be defeated by
such a conveyance as parts with the possession, the title and the enjoyment during
the grantor's lifetime.'
''See also, Dubois' Appeal, 121 Pa. 368, 15
Atl. 641.
"It stands as an admitted fact, and that
should be borne in n1ind at all times in the consideration of the ownership of this stock, that
all of the stock was originally the individual property of George Romney. If the naked legal title
to that stock or the enjoyment of the beneficial interest, or both, ever vested in the respondent corporation, such vested interest is based wholly
upon the voluntary relinquishment and transfer
by the act of the donor.
''We need not determine in this proceeding
whether the facts warrant the conclusion that there
ever had been a completed gift even of the naked
title. There is no dispute in the law as to "'\vhat
acts are requisite to constitute a completed gift.
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1~

n,.('i.L. ~):1~: ).fnxler Y. Ha,vk, 233 Pa. 316, 82
..:\tl. ~51, ..:\nn. ( ~ns. 1913B, 559. The difficulty
arises in nppl~~ing ~uch rules to the multitudiness
( sie.) nnd co1nplirn tad transactions of men.
Cook Y. Lnn1, ;);) N. J. La\v 373, 26 Atl. 803. In
the d istri.ct cou.rt the Attorney General tried this
case 'Upon the theory flint the beneficial interest
and enjoynzent had not 'Cested in the donee until
the death of the donor, and the case has been
argued upon that theory here. We are clearly of
the opinion that the undisputed facts sustain that
theory, and that no other conclusion is permissible than that such interest and enjoyment did
not vest in the respondent corporation until the
death of George Romney." (Italics ours.)

This Court in the Romney case "\Vas faced with exactly the san1e statutory language providing for an estate
tax as is under consideration in. the case at bar. There
has been no material change in our death duty tax,
which has always been an estate tax. Although no trust
indenture was involved, the underlying facts were substantially the same, namely, George Romney retained
the economic benefits, that is to say, the income, from
the property during his lifetime. This retention of the
income from the property, the economic enjoyment of
the property for life, was held to bring the transfers
squarely within the statutory language. That rule has
never been questioned by any subsequent decision of this
Court and governs the case presented on this appeal.
As authority for its decision in the Romney case,
this Court cited the cases of Reish v. Commonwealth, 106
Pa. St. Rep. 521, and DuBois' Appeal, 121 Pa. 368, 15
Atl. 641. Let us, therefore, analyze these tvvo cases.
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In the case of Reish v. C onunontvealth, supra, the
facts were these: A short tin1e prior to his death John
Reish transferred all his real estate by a deed in fee
simple to his brother, Isaac R,eish. There was no reservation or condition placed upon the transfer in the deed
itself. On the san1e day, however, Isaac Reish executed
a penal bond in the sum of $5,000.00 in favor of John
Reish, conditional upon his paying to John Reish the
net income from the property during John's lifetime.
Isaac Reish contended that at the time of John's death
the decedent was seized of no property and that John
had absolutely and unconditionally transferred the property to Isaac during John's lifetime. The Pennsylvania
law at that time made no provision for the taxation of
property transferred in contemplation of death and,
therefore, there was no question raised as to contemplation of death. The Pennsylvania law, however, did provide that the tax should apply to ''all estates * * * passing from any person * * * either by will or * -x· * transferred by deed, grant, bargain or sale made, or intended
to take effect, in possession or enjoyment, after the death
of the grantor,* =X• ·x-." Note that the language there contained is identical in effect with our statutory provision.
Note also that the only reservation made by the grantor
was the reservation of the net income fron1 the property
for the period of the grantor's life.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held this transfer subject to tax under the quoted provision of their la 'v
and stated at Page 525 of 106 Pa. :
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~~The deed and the bond 'vere contemporaneous, the exerution and delivery of both constituted a single transaction; the deed was absolute,
it contained no eondition, it was without reservation; but the bond, although in the form of a mere
personal obligation, 'vas in effect, we think, as
regards the rollateral inheritance tax, a postponement of the tin1e of enjoy1nent, a reservation of
the income and profits of the property, during the
lifetime of the grantor. All property is subject to
the tax 'vhich, in the language of the statute, is
transferred by deed, etc., made or intended to take
effect in possession, or enjoyment after the death
of the grantor. The commonwealth's right to collateral inheritance tax is, therefore, not defeated
by a conveyance of the title, nor by possession
taken under it, if the enjoyn1ent is intended to take
effect at the death of the grantor. The enjoyment
of real estate is not the exact equivalent of possession, nor is it so used in this statute; in no case
could the distinction be more clearly made, than
in the case under consideration. Under his deed,
Isaac Reish was the undoubted owner of the lands
in fee, and of the personalty absolutely, and the
title drew to it the right of possession; but by the
express contemporaneous agreement of the parties, the ownership took effect in enjoyment at
the death of the grantor. John Reish, was entitled
to receive the same income and profits from the
property, during his life, as if the transfer had
not been made. One certainly cannot be considered,
as in the actual enjoyment of an estate, who has
no right to the profits or incomes arising or accruing therefron1.

''It is true, the obligation of the bond was
not inserted as a condition or reservation in the
deed, it was in form a n1ere personal obligation;
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but this contention does not involve a technical
question of title nor of lien, the \vhole matter
depends upon the single fact, "\vhether or not the
transfer was made or intended to take effect, in
enjoyment at the death of the grantor. The policy
of the law will not permit the o-vvner of an estate,
to defeat the plain provisions of the collateral
inheritance law, by any device which secures to
him, for life, the income, profits, and enjoyment
thereof; it n1ust be by such a conveyance as parts
with the possession, the title, and the enjoyrnent
in the grantor's life time."
The case of DuBois' Appeal, supra, involved this
situation: John DuBois transferred to his nephew certain
property during his lifetime. By the terms of the conveyance it was provided that the nephew was to pay and
discharge all debts, notes, obligations, contracts, clairns
for damages, etc., of every nature and character of the
grantor. The legal title, however, was recognized by the
court as having been definitely and finally vested in the
grantee, and the grantee actually took physical possession of the property. The question was as to the taxability of this transfer under the same provision of the
Pennsylvania law above quoted in connection with the
Reish v. Commonwealth case. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that by reason of the terms of the conveyance
it was clear that the grantor intended to retain the enjoyment of the property during his lifetime and that,
therefore, the transfer \vas a transfer to take effect in
enjoyment at or after death. In this connection, the court
made the following statement at Pages 642-3 of 15 Atl.:
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· ~ Th~ naked legal title arquired by the grantee
\\·as the lllerest ~hndow. rrhe grantor held a firm
gra~p on the entire substance, and he retained it
as long as he liYed. In Yiew of all this it is idle
to contend that, in any proper or statutory sense
of the "Tord 'Pnjoyn1ent,' the conveyance in question took effect or could have been intended to
take effect in enjoyu1ent prior to the death of John
DuBois. * * :K• ~'
These same hvo Pennsylvania cases were cited by
the Iowa Supreme Court in its decision in Lamb's Estate
v. lllorrow, 117 N. W. 1118 (1908). The rule laid down
in that case at Page 1121 is as follo,vs:
"It is no doubt true that the owner of an estate
eannot defeat the tax by any device which secures
to hi1n for life the income, profits, or enjoyment
thereof. The conveyance must be such as passes
the possession, the title and the enjoyment of the
property in the grantor's lifetime. This is the rule
in other states having statutes similar to our o"vn.
(See Seibert's Appeal, 110 P. 329, 1 Atl. 346; DuBois' Appeal, 121 Pa. 368, 15 Atl. 641; Reish v.
Com., 106 Pa. 521; In re Brandreth's Estate, 169
N. Y. 437, 62 N. E. 563, 58 L. R. A. 148; In re
Green's Estate, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292), and
should be the one adopted here.''
In the case of In re Brandreth's Estate, 169 N. Y.
437, 62 N. E. 563, the same fundamental question was
there raised. The facts were that in 1893 one G-eorge A.
Brandreth transferred certain stock to his four daughters. On the same day his daughters executed an instrument and delivered it to Brandreth. It "vas recited in the
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instrun1ent that Brandreth had transferred the stock
"upon the condition that he is to receive all dividends
declared on said stock for the term of his life * * * ''.
This agreement also provided that the transfer and
agreement were both to be irrevocable. Brandreth died
six years later, and the question arose as to the taxabilit~T
of this transfer. The New York Court of Appeals held
the transfer to be one in tended ''to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the decedent". See New York Laws, 1896, Chapter 908, Section 220 (3). It is to be noted that the language of the
New York Statute was almost identical with ours. In
holding this transfer taxable, the New York Court of
Appeals made the following statement at Page 565 of 62
N. E.:
"In the present case the prior estate is one for
the life of the donor, and therefore the ren1ainder
transferred to his daughters falls within the exact
provision of the statute as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment on the death of
the donor. This is the doctrine of our previous
decision on the subject. In Re Green's Estate, 153
N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292, the donor transferred personal property in trust to apply the income to herself during life, and upon her death to divide the
sa1ne among her nieces, with provision for substitution in case of the death of any niece before the
donor. It was held that the transfer was subject
to the tax. Judge 0 'Brien there said: 'It is not
important to determine whether the trust instrument was made in contemplation of death, or
vvhether, upon the delivery thereof, the renlainders vested in the nieces in such a sense as to
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e,)n~ti.tute

a gift intPr YiYos, 'vithin the 1neaning
of the rases riterl by the learned counsel for the
re2-pondent. It 1nny be ronceded that upon the
deliYery of thP trust deed an interest in remainder
Yested in the nieces suhjert to open and let in the
children of one 'Yho had died during the lifetirne
of the donor, ~-:rr()rding to the terms of the instrument. The real question is whether the remainders 'vhirh the nieces took under the deed
'vere intended to ''take effect, in possession or enjoynlent," at or after the death of the donor.' In
the Green case the donor reserved the povver to
modify the terms of the trust with the consent of
the trustee, 'vhile in the present case, the renlainder given the daughters vvas absolute, and
not subject to be devested in any contingency
\vhateYer. But this difference does not affect the
statutory liability to taxation, since in both cases
the gift took effect in possession and enjoyment
o:aly on the death of the donor.''
The theory of the tax upon such a transfer is even
more clearly announced by the New York Court of
Appeals in the case of In re Keeney's Estate, 194 N.Y.
281, 87 N. E. 428. In that case a trust was created with a
reservation to the trustor of one-fourth of the income
for the term of her life. Again the New York Court
held that this reservation of income made the transfer taxable to the extent of the value of one-fourth of the trust
property, the inco1ne fro1n which was reserved to the
grantor for life. At Page 429 the New York Court said:
"A not ":holly unnatural desire exists among
owners of property to avoid the imposition of inheritance taxes upon the estates they may leave,
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so that such estates n1ay pass to the objects of
their bounty unimpaired. It is a matter of common
knowledge that for this purpose trusts or other
conveyances are rnade whereby the grantor reserves to himself the beneficial enjoyment of his
estate during life. Were it not for the provision
of the statute which is challenged, it is clear that
in many cases the estate on the death of the
grantor would pass free from tax to the same
persons who \vould take it had the grantor made
a will or died intestate. It is true that an ingenious
n1ind n1ay devise other means of avoiding an inheritance tax, but the one commonly used is a
transfer with reservation of a life estate. We think
this fact justified the Legislature in singling out
this class of transfers as subject to a special tax.''
It is to be further noted in connection with the
Brandreth case, supra, and the Keeney case, supra, that
the New York Law at that time provided for a transfer
tax and not an inheritance tax. See W adharns Consolidated Laws of New York, 1909, 'Tol. V, Pages 4347-8,
Section 220 (4); Laws of New York, 1896, Chapter 908,
Section 220 (3). In other words, the New York Court of
Appeals made no distinction for this purpose between
an inheritance and a transfer tax, and as we have stated
above, we submit there is no distinction.
In connection with our discussion of the Brandreth
case, supra, we call attention to the fact that the language of the New York law there involved was identical
with ours so far as providing a tax on a transfer intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death
is concerned. It is generally conceded that the State of
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X e\Y York ,,·a~ the origin a tor of the transfer and inheritanee taxes. ~-\s this Court pointed out in the case of
ln re Co1ran'"' ]~_,state. ~)8 lTtah 393, 99 Pac. (2d) 605,
(1940), at least parts of our so-called Inheritance Tax
Law 'Yere adopted fro1n N e"r 1. . ork statutes. In view of
the identical language contained in Laws of New York,
1896, Chapter 908, Section 220 (3) and that contained in
the present section of our law, it is reasonable to assun1e
that our Legislature adopted that language from the New
York statute. Based upon this assumption, it is our further contention that there thus appears an additional
reason ""'"hy this Court should hold the transfer here in
question subject to tax as one intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death.
Thjs Court, in several cases, has announced the rule
that when we adopt a statute from another state the
interpretation given to the language of the statute by
the Supreme Court of that other state is presumed to
prevail. This, of course, is based upon the theory that
when our Legislature used certain language in enacting
a statute it is presumed to have had in mind the interpretation of the language by the court of the state from
which the statutory language came. See Norville v. State
Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 Pac. (2d) 937; In re
Cowan's Estate, supra.
The statutory language, ''a transfer intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death,''
received attention of the New York Court of Appeals,
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the highest court of New Y or1~, at ]east twice before that
lDnguage was adopted by our Legislature. See In re
Green's Estate, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292, and In re
Brandreth's Estate, supra. In both of these cases the
New York Court of Appeals held that a completed transfer inter vivos of the legal title to property, with a reservation by the grantor of the income of the property for
his life, was a taxable transfer within the meaning of
the words ''intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death.'' Therefore, that same language in our statute should be given the sa1ne interpretation, and the transfer here in question held subject to
tax. This is doubly important when we re1nember that
the New York I_.jaw provided for a transfer, not an inheritance, tax.
As was indicated by the list of authorities previonsl)T
set forth, all holding transfers such as this subject to
tax as transfers intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after death, there is a \vealth of authority on this subject. We \Vould like to discuss each of
these in· detail, but to do so would involve making this
brief too voluminous. A fair reading of these state cases
cannot but impress the reader with the careful reasoning
developed by the state courts in making their decisions.
When the state court decisions, with the close, logical
reasoning there present, are compared with JJ!ay r.
Heiner and the total lack of reasoning or logic to support
that decision, we feel that this Court will follow the state
courts whose decisions indicate thought and studv.
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One of the eol~lnlon threads 'vhich is found running
throug·h all of thesp stntP court rases is the idea that this
particular languag't~ in the statute is enacted for the purpose of stopping tax Pvasion. lt is readily seen that inheritance or estate taxes could be made of practically no
effect as revenue n1easures "~ere it not for provisions in
the la"~s taxing inter vivos transfers which partake in
some particular or another of testamentary dispositions.
This is true of the provisions taxing transfers in contemplation of death. It is true of the tax placed upon
transfers by right of survivorship through the medium
of joint tenancy.
L-

It is equally true of the tax on transfers made in a
manner so as to enable the grantor or donor to retain
the economic uses and benefits of the property until his
death. Ordinarily, people desire to insure. themselves
sufficient incon1e during their lifetime to provide a cornfortable living according to the standards to which they
are accustomed. At the same time they also desire to
dispose of their property in such a way as to insure the
property's benefiting objects of their bounty and no one
else. Wealthy people are faced with a third consideration-death duty taxes. \.,..arious devices are used to avoid
or reduce death duty tax liability. So long as these devices remain within the terms of the law there is, of
course, no objection, n1oral or legal, to their use. However, ,ve submit that the use of an irrevocable trust with
a reservation to the trustor of the total economic benefit of the property during the term of the trustor's life
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is a means of avoidance which our I~egislature has stopped by the statutory language relied upon hy respondent.
We think that a transfer by any device, be it by a deed
of land with a reservation of a life estate or through the
vehicle of a trust, by reason of which the grantor is
unable to secure for his own use and benefit the inco1ne
from the property so long as he lives, is exactly the
transfer which was intended to be reached by the wording of our statute including within the gross estate all
transfers ''made * * * or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death."
Let us analyze more carefully the exact wording of
that statutory provision: First, it covers only transfers
made by a living person. It is in addition to transfers hy
will or laws of intestacy. It is also in addition to transfers in contemplation of death and transfers by right
of survivorship. Certainly, there can be no question but
that, in the case at bar, there \vas a transfer inter vivos.
The next condition is that it be made or intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death.
In this case Mrs. Walker transferred the legal title to the
property to the Walker Bank and Trust Company in
trust for certain purposes. We have, therefore, a completed transfer of the legal title, but the transfer is con1plete only to the extent that the Walker Bank and Trust
Company as a trustee was vested with the legal title.
There can be no contention, we think, that the Walker
Bank and Trust Company received the enjoJinent of this
property. Therefore, the only other persons \vho eonltl
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haYl' l'tlePiYPd an~r enjoy1nent fro1n the property must
haYe been eithel~ the sPttlor or the beneficiaries. What
enjo)J.nent did the henefieinries receive at the ti1ne Mrs.
\Y.alker transfprrPd th0 property to the Walker Bank and
Trust Con1pany? \'\~ e S1.1b1nit that they received no enjoynlent and no possession. The possession may legally
have been transferred to the \Valker Bank and Trust
Company, but "~hat happened to the enjoyment of the
property~ Until the death of Mrs. Walker, the settlor,
no one received any economic enjoyment from this property but the same ~Irs. Walker. The use of the income in
the form of dividends from stocks is the enjoyrnent of
that property. lTntil ~frs. Walker died no one but Mrs.
\\Talker~ herself, "\Yas entitled to the enjoyment of any of
the income. At her death, however, this enjoyment
shifted from :Jirs. \\Talker to the beneficiaries of the trust.
The only event which under the terms of the trust could
bring this enjoyment into being in the beneficiaries vvas
the death of ~frs. Walker.
Let us suppose that all of the beneficiaries named in
the trust predeceased 1Irs. Walker. Could it be logically
contended that any such predeceased beneficiary had had
any enjoJinent of this trust property~ We think not.
The cases above cited in this brief in support of our
contention also develop the theory that all death duty
taxes are levied upon the shifting of economic benefits
from one person to another. The death of Mrs. Walker in
this case vvas the only possible source which could generate the shifting of the economic benefit of the trust
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property fro~ her to the beneficiaries. ller death, so
far as the beneficiaries are concerned, gave them something which they did not possess before; namely, the
right to the use of the income from the trust property.
We contend that this transfer comes directly within
the exact language of the statute and is, therefore, taxable.

CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that the intent of the Legislature was to reach just such transfers as this when the
language in question was enacted. This Court should
give effort to legislative intent and upon doing so will
hold this transfer taxable.
We have also demonstrated that the Federal rule
above discussed is not supported by the better reasoning
nor by the weight of authority but that logic, authority
and common sense dictate but one result-the taxability
of this transfer.
We have shown that the original Federal rule in
May v. Heiner has been overruled by more recent decisions. Therefore, the Federal rule should not be taken
into consideration in analyzing this problem. In any
event, the Federal rule is not binding on this Court.
We submit that there is no valid basis for distinction,
so far as the question here presented. to this Court is
concerned, between an ''inheritance'' tax and an '' estate" tax. Appellant has suggested no valid basis for
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distinetion, and \YP ha Ye hePn able to find none. Therefore, th~ rule nnnolnH•P<l h~· all of the state courts should
be follo\Yed b~· this C~onrt and this transfer held taxable.
Finally, \Ye ~u1nnit that if such a transfer as this is
not held taxable "'"ithin the provisions of our present law,
there is immediately open to all taxpayers of any considerable financial means an obvious and evident loophole
for avoidance of inheritance tax. Such a result should be
reached by this Court only if no other result is possibie
under the present statutory language. We think there is
ample authority, ample reasoning, and ample basis in our
statute as it no'v reads to hold this transfer taxable. In
fact, \Ye submit that any other holding would be against
the plain meaning and intent of the words ''made * * :K•
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death.''
It is, therefore, the position of the State Tax Commission that the District Court correctly ruled upon this
question and that its ruling should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON,
Attorney for Respondent.
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